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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with California's landmark Serrano v. Priest case in 1971, states have moved towards increasingly redistributive school finance policies, with 22 states since having been ordered by their Supreme Courts to redistribute funds towards lower-income school districts.
The main documented effect of these equalizations has been to increase the level and progressivity of state spending on schools. When states spend more on education, that changes both state and local budget constraints, and thus may affect many different spending and revenue decisions. States allocate funds to localities for many different programs, so mandated increases in state spending on education could result in offsetting reductions in funds provided to localities for other programs. Similarly, localities might react to these changes by changing their own revenue and spending decisions. The net effect of increased state spending on education on the total resources available to localities and spending on public goods may thus be quite different from the gross change in state education budgets. Given that localities receive thirty percent of their total revenues in the form of state intergovernmental grants, about 60 percent of which is earmarked for education, changes to this stream of funding are likely to have substantial effects on other aspects of state and local budgets. This is thus a particularly fertile area through which to explore the broader issues of the effectiveness of redistribution through earmarked funds and intergovernmental spillovers in the provision of public goods.
While a substantial body of research has documented that these state school finance equalization measures have increased both state spending on education and school budgets in low-income districts (but sometimes also reduced budgets in high-income districts), little attention has been paid to the potential offsetting reactions of state and local governments. Do states and localities act to negate any net change in mandated state education spending? Do 2 school finance equalization measures increase the total resources available to low-income districts, or do they merely restrict the mix of grants they receive? Does total spending on public goods increase? What is the ultimate incidence of the mandate?
We examine the effect of mandated increases in state education spending on the distribution of public spending on a variety of programs -both education and non-education.
We begin with an analysis of the impact of school finance equalizations (SFEs) on the level and progressivity of state intergovernmental aid to localities for education and for other program
areas. Next, we analyze data at the local level to examine: (1) how states reallocate noneducation funds in response to mandated increases in education spending; (2) how local governments respond to changes in state education aid through their own revenue-raising behavior; and (3) how changes in state education aid affect local spending on education and other programs. We explore the factors that drive heterogeneity of local responses, including demographics, economic conditions, and political and legislative constraints. This approach allows us to consider the average and distributional consequences of increases in state education spending across different programs and different localities.
We use data on school finance equalizations and state and local revenues and expenditures in the 1980s and 1990s to explore these spillover effects. We find that both states and localities react to offset some of the changes in mandated state education spending. We find that mandated school finance equalizations do increase both the level and progressivity of state spending on education, but that states finance the required increase in education spending in part by reducing their aid to localities for other programs. While localities do get more money from the state for education after a court-ordered school finance equalization, for every dollar of increased state education aid they lose about 20 cents of state aid for other programs. Local 3 governments respond to the increases in state taxation and spending by reducing their own revenue-raising, their own spending on education (thus blunting the effect of the increases in state education spending), and their spending on other programs.
Thus, while state education aid increases total spending on education, it does so at the expense of drawing resources away from spending on programs like public welfare, highways, and hospitals. Understanding these spillover effects is critical not only for understanding the full incidence of the mandated increases in state education aid, but also more broadly for evaluating the effectiveness of using earmarked funds to achieve redistribution. The effectiveness of redistribution through specific programs is limited by the ability of intervening levels of government to undo that redistribution and to redirect funds for other purposes, thus affecting the level, composition, and distribution of public spending.
II. BACKGROUND ON SCHOOL SPENDING AND SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS
Our central question is how state education aid to local school districts affects the total resources available to school districts and other local governments, and how much those local governments spend on programs, both education and non-education. Court-ordered school finance equalizations, in addition to being widely utilized policy instruments of independent interest, provide us with a source of externally-imposed variation in how states transfer funds to local school districts. other sources and expenditures on other programs. We examine both the level and distributional effects of state education spending on local revenues and expenditures using SFEs to abstract from confounding changes in demographics and economic conditions. We also explore the demographic, economic, and political factors driving heterogeneous responses to changes in state education spending. In this section we detail our empirical strategy for answering these questions, and in the next section we describe our data. 4 While we do not build a formal model of voter and legislature behavior here, our implicit framework is straightforward and similar in flavor to that of Baron and Ferejohn (1987 and 1989) . The legislature makes allocative decisions which reflect the preferences of voters in the represented districts and the strategic behavior of representatives seeking re-election, given agenda-setting rules governing the legislative body. When the court mandates a school finance equalization, the basic intuition is that the legislature is no longer free to distribute education resources as they wish (they are now constrained in how they do this by the judicial mandate), so the distribution of funds designated for other purposes may change as well in order to return the distribution of net resources to an equilibrium state. where i indexes the county-level observation, t indexes time, and X is a vector of time-varying county-level demographics (including population, employment rates, racial composition, and urbanicity). While local median family income is time-varying, relative family income is measured in standard deviations from the state-year average in 1982 (and is therefore constant for a given county over time). SFE indicates that i's state has received a court-order to equalize school spending at any time before the current year. 3 δ thus tells us the change in progressivity of state grants to localities under the post-SFE regime.
School Finance Equalizations and State Spending

Changes in Local Spending and Revenues
Finally, we want to know the effect of exogenous changes in state education expenditures on other categories of local spending and revenue-raising. 
where the dependent variable is local revenue from various sources (including that raised locally and that received through intergovernmental transfers) and expenditure on different programs (including education and non-education). i indexes counties (including, as discussed below, all sub-units of government contained within a county, such as school districts and towns), s indexes states, and t indexes time. Demographic covariates X again include county-area population, employment/population ratio, median family income (changing over time), percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban.
Clearly if we were to estimate this regression via least squares, the coefficient δ would capture not only state reactions to being forced to increase education grants, but also underlying economic conditions, the state's overall propensity to redistribute, demographic conditions, etc.
not a causal connection between how much aid the state gives a locality for education and how much the state gives that area for other programs or how much the locality spends. Wealthy areas will be eligible for fewer categorical funds for poverty programs, for example, and will also receive fewer state education dollars per pupil if the state school finance system is progressive. This does not imply that receiving lower amounts of education aid causes them to receive less revenue targeted for public welfare programs from the state. While we control for many demographic variables (and county and time fixed effects), we still do not have access to the full set of administrative data used in allocating categorical grants, nor to all data likely to influence local demand for public goods.
In order to find out whether changes in state education revenue are offset by changes in other state aid and how such changes affect local spending and revenue choices, we need to use an exogenous source of variation in school spending. Fortunately, as previous literature suggests 12 and as we demonstrate below, the school finance equalization measures discussed above provide just such a source of variation. By focusing on the change in state education revenue to local areas that is mandated by the imposition of a court-ordered SFE, we can see if a shock to education revenue is offset by changes in other resources available to the area, and how it affects local spending decisions.
We implement this strategy via two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimation, and later show that the results are robust under several alternate specifications. The first stage isolates the exogenous portion of changes in state education revenue received by county areas by estimating state aid to localities based on local demographics X, county and time fixed effects, and whether a court-ordered SFE is in place. Our first stage is thus:
We then estimate equation (4) via two-stage least squares, using the predicted education revenue from the state from equation (5).
Heterogeneity of Responses
Localities may respond differently to these changes, however, based on factors such as demographics, legal environment, or income. We begin by examining whether high-and lowincome districts respond differently. We expect heterogeneity of response by income-level to the extent that median income is correlated with demand for education spending and with the heterogeneous effects of SFEs within states. 6 We include the interaction of relative family These specifications allow us to examine more fully the role that income has on the heterogeneity of local responses to changes in state spending on education.
There are other dimensions along which local responses may vary systematically. We include analysis of the effects of six other factors (tax and expenditure limits, home ownership, the size of local government relative to state government, poverty rates, dependent versus independent school district structure, and the black population share) on the responses of localities. The presence of tax and expenditure limits may constrain the choices available to states and local jurisdictions. Home ownership rates may affect the distribution of costs and benefits of different tax and expenditure bundles as the quality of local public goods is capitalized into home prices. Localities in states where local government plays a larger role relative to state government may have differential ability to offset changes in state behavior.
14 Funds in school districts that rely on a parent local jurisdiction for funding may be more susceptible to redirection. We allow the effect of mandated changes in state education revenues to vary based on each of these factors in turn.
IV. DATA
The goal of this analysis is to determine the effect of mandated changes in school spending on the total revenues available to local governments, the composition of those revenues, and how those revenues are allocated across expenditure programs. If states become constrained in how they distribute education aid to school districts, does this affect how the level and progressivity of their spending on all programs? How do localities change their spending and revenues in response to these changes? How does local income affect these responses? We thus need data on state local revenue and expenditures on different categories, the presence of a court-ordered SFE, and controls for local demographics and economic conditions.
The County-area Unit of Observation
School districts are distinct governmental units, and state education aid typically flows directly to them rather than through other local governments. 7 Because school districts by definition spend only on education, we must look to the local governments with which they are geographically coterminous if we wish to identify the effects of SFEs on revenues and
expenditures not related to education. Therefore, some type of linkage from school districts to local governments is necessary for investigating effects of state education aid on intergovernmental revenues earmarked for and spending on non-education programs. We analyze primarily major revenue and expenditure categories, and for consistency we construct total revenue and direct expenditure by aggregating up spending and revenues from these categories. 12 The totals presented here are therefore smaller than actual totals reported in the Census of Governments data and education spending as a share of our total spending measure is a larger ratio than education spending as a share of the reported Census of Governments total.
Our totals are, however, consistently constructed over time to contain the largest sources of revenues and expenditures. Real county-area revenues per capita in our sample grew from 14 From the data in our Table 2 , we create a dichotomous SFE variable indicating if the state has had its school finance regime ruled unconstitutional in the past or in that year.
Classification of School Finance Equalizations
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Covariates We control for county-level population, employment/population ratio, relative family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban in all specifications.
We obtain these variables from the Area Resource File and the Census Bureau.
13 For lists of cases in which state supreme courts upheld school finance systems or in which reform was legislatively rather than judicially induced, see Card and Payne, 
V. RESULTS
We set out now to answer three questions: First, how do school finance equalizations change state spending and revenue? Second, how do they change the progressivity of state spending, not only on education but on all other programs? Third, how do these changes in state spending affect localities' revenues from other sources and expenditures on other programs?
The Effect of SFEs on State Spending and Revenues
We present results on aggregate state responses to school finance equalizations, from the estimation of equation (1), in Table 3 . Estimating the regression at the state level with only four years of data unsurprisingly yields mainly imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant results. We estimate insignificant but positive effects of SFE on elementary-secondary spending (both total and intergovernmental) and spending on all intergovernmental grants. The estimation also yields positive and insignificant point estimates on total revenue and two of its major components, sales tax revenue and revenue from charges, although the estimated effect on income tax revenue is negative (again, insignificantly so). These results are generally consistent with those of Murray, Evans, and Schwab, who find that school finance equalizations typically are not self-financing, and that states finance them through increased revenue collection rather than through cuts in other programs. It is also worth noting that the increases in state spending come not just through education spending (which is primarily intergovernmental), but also perhaps through public welfare spending -although none of these is significant at the 5 percent level.
This state-level data also gives us an opportunity to explore the predictability of SFEs.
Are certain states more likely to be under court order to increase (the equity of) their school spending? We estimate equation (2) to gauge the exogeneity of the timing of court-ordered SFEs. The adjusted R 2 from this regression is 0.037, corroborating the findings of previous research that the presence of SFEs is largely unpredictable. Results from a Probit, rather than this linear probability model, predict the presence of SFEs equally badly, with a pseudo-R 2 of 0.058. and do so progressively.
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The Progressivity of State Education and Non-Education Grants
Level and Distribution of Local Spending and Revenues
We next examine the effect of changes in state education spending on local revenues (including revenues to localities from the state for education, other revenues from the state, and locally-raised revenues) and expenditures (including education and non-education spending).
We begin by estimating equation (4) via OLS. These results are shown in Table 5 : these (naïve) regressions suggest that every dollar of state intergovernmental expenditure on education results in an offsetting reduction in total local revenue-raising of about 41 cents. Almost the entire net increase in revenues the locality sees (64 cents) goes straight to education spending, which increases by 53 cents. Spending on several other categories does not change statistically significantly; in those categories for which it does, the magnitude of the changes are extremely small (always less than a two-cent increase or decrease in spending in response to a one-dollar increase in education revenue).
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Because state and local spending decisions are based on local economic conditions, demographics, and preferences, the OLS results may not capture the causal relationship we would like to identify. We use the presence of court-ordered school finance equalization measures, as described above, to capture exogenous changes in the revenues localities receive from the state for education. We next estimate equation (4) using the presence of school finance equalizations to instrument for state intergovernmental spending on education. 17 Table 6 On the expenditure side, we see that while education expenditures go up (with a coefficient of $0.86 that is significantly different from zero and not from one), expenditures on several other categories go down -in particular hospitals, highways, health and public welfare.
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In fact, these decline by so much that there is no significant net effect of the state education aid on total direct expenditures. 20 Third, we show the propensity score matching estimator. 21 While some of these estimates are imprecise, in each case the results are quite consistent.
Heterogeneity of State Responses
Next, we consider several different potential sources of heterogeneity of local responses.
While Table 6 shows us the effect of SFE-driven state education spending on the average locality, Table 8 presents estimates of equation (6) In Table 8 we also show the results of equation (7), which allows the effect of income to be continuous but asymmetric, to see if income affects the responses of richer counties differently from the way it affects poorer counties. 22 We report the probability that income differentially affects the responses of counties above and below the median income for their state in 1982 (or that δ 2 = δ 3 from equation (7)). It appears that high income counties see a greater offsetting reduction in both total expenditures and total revenues as their income rises (the first column in each panel). The offsetting reduction in revenues seems to come, again, primarily from reductions in own-source local revenue. There seem to be greater reductions in several expenditure categories, although the standard errors are too large in most cases to conclude that responses are asymmetric. In the bottom panel of Table 9 , we next show results on heterogeneity of response by whether counties have higher poverty rates than the state average (again, in 1982). These results are consistent with the results by income in Table 8 , which showed higher income counties experience more offsetting results from other state aid and total spending; here we see that counties with higher poverty rates experience less offsetting along these dimensions. Fifth, we examine the differential impact of state education aid on county-level revenues and expenditures for counties with and without dependent school districts. The only significant response we see here is for total expenditures, which is consistent with the fiscal dependence of these districts facilitating the process of their parent governments moving state aid earmarked for schools into other budget categories. Last, we examine the role that the racial composition of the countyareas plays in its response to changes in state education aid. None of these coefficients is significantly different from zero. Overall, while these interactions provide some intriguing hints about the underlying process governing local responses to changes in state education spending, none seems decisive in driving the heterogeneity of state responses.
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VI. CONCLUSION
School finance equalizations are increasingly being used as a policy tool to improve outcomes for poor children. The existing literature shows that these equalizations have had at least some success in redistributing state education dollars towards children in school districts with lower property wealth, but how redistributive these programs are and how they ultimately 26 affect child outcomes depend critically on any resulting changes in other public expenditure programs. While it is difficult to design systems that prevent any local "undoing" of redistribution from higher-level jurisdictions (or "undoing" of net redistribution by those higherlevel jurisdictions themselves), understanding the magnitude and impact of such responses should inform policy design. Changes in state intergovernmental spending on education provide valuable insight into these spillovers -both because of the prominence of direct and intergovernmental education spending in state and local budgets and because of the policy experiments that mandated changes in the level and distribution of state spending.
We find that states did change their spending patterns in a way that partially offset the mandated increase in their education spending (although not in a way that diminished their progressivity). Each dollar of increased education funding a locality received from the state resulted in an average decline in funds from the state for other purposes of about 20 cents.
Localities, in turn, reacted to the increased state revenue-raising and spending by cutting back on their own revenue-raising and their spending on both education and other programs. The greatest impacts were on hospitals, highways, and welfare, but there were also significant declines in spending on police, public health, fire protection, and public buildings. Thus, while mandated increases in state education aid did increase total spending on education, they did so at the expense of drawing resources away from spending on other programs. These effects were greater in higher-income counties.
Researchers need to incorporate the effect of these offsetting responses when they analyze the effects of mandated education spending changes on student outcomes, such as achievement test scores, high school dropout rates, and college attendance. Changes in these outcomes reflect not only the changes in education spending but also changes in other resources 27 which are inputs into those same student outcomes. If, for example, high school dropout rates are unchanged with increased spending from school finance equalizations, a naïve interpretation would suggest that "money doesn't matter" for education. If, in fact, students are simultaneously experiencing a decline in programs such as community policing, summer camps, and vaccination campaigns, both educational resources and other resources could have mattered for student outcomes very much indeed.
More broadly, these results have strong implications for redistribution policy in a federal system -both across programs and between localities. The effectiveness of redistribution through specific programs is limited by the ability of intervening levels of government to undo that redistribution and to redirect funds for other purposes. State governments may change both the composition of funding that each locality receives and the division of resources between localities in response to mandated changes in spending on certain programs or to certain jurisdictions. Local jurisdictions, in turn, may also change the level and composition of their own spending. Policy-makers must decide whether their goal is to change the level, distribution, or composition of public spending, and then anticipate the potentially off-setting reactions of intervening levels of government.
These findings also prompt many new questions -both for education policy and for public spending more generally. While we have shown that school finance equalizations on average have important spillover effects on other revenues and expenditures, the details of those equalizations, the policy environments in which they occur (such as under different school accountability measures or property tax limits), and how states raise revenue likely matter significantly in determining the nature of state and local responses. 25 Furthermore, while we 28 have documented particular spillovers that result from policies aimed at redistribution through narrow programs, there are several other potential channels through which spillovers may occur.
First, future work will couple analysis of the progressivity of state education spending with a parallel analysis of the progressivity of state and local raising-revenue -since changes in revenue patterns may change the net distribution of resources across residents of different localities.
Second, changes in state education financing schemes or other changes to how local public goods are financed may affect local residential sorting and property values. Incorporating these broader spillover effects will further refine our understanding of the effectiveness not only of school finance equalization measures but of targeted redistribution policy in a federal system.
facing local governments. Again, changes in those parameters induced by court rulings can identify shifts in local responses that are not correlated with changes in state-level preferences for redistribution or education spending. IV regressions in first two panels control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban). IV is presence of court-ordered school finance equalization. Propensity score matching in third panel is performed using covariates listed above, and the propensity score and propensity score squared are included in second stage regressions.
IV Fixed Effects IV Random Effects
Total Expend All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban).
Interaction:
0. Interaction terms are all measured in the initial period and constant over time. Home ownership (percent of population owning home) and local control (local revenues from own sources/state revenues from own sources) are dummy variables for values higher than the median in the initial period.
All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban). 
